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NOTES
RIGHT TO DIE-COURT REQUIRES CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE
PATIENT'S INTENT TO TERMINATE LIFE-SUSTAINING
PROCEDURES; HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT OF 1993
CASTS NEW LIGHT ON OUTCOME. Mack v. Mack, 329
Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993).
For decades, the advocacy of groups supporting euthanasia, as
well as the actions of those such as Dr. Kevorkian, have piqued the
nation's awareness of the medical and ethical issues concerning the
right to die. Due to the "constantly increasing power of science to
keep the human body alive for longer than any reasonable person
would want to inhabit it," I the right to die has begun to make
inroads in our laws. Legislatures across the nation have now addressed this issue and most states have laws protecting some version
of the right to die. 2 Generally, the argument for the right to die is
most persuasive in situations where a person ·is kept alive artificially
against his will.3
Before the enactment of the Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 4
(HCDA), Maryland had two statutes governing who had the right to
die, who could invoke this right, and under what circumstances.
Maryland's Living Will StatuteS enabled an individual to write a
declaration directing the withholding of life-sustaining procedures in
the event of a terminal illness. In lieu of such a declaration, Maryland's Guardian Statute 6 allowed an appointed guardian to determine
I. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 227, 618 A.2d 744, 764 (1993) (McAuliffe, J.,

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

dissenting) (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 292 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring».
See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Mo. 1988); see also John Carroll
Byrnes, The Health Care Decisions Act of 1993,23 U. BALT. L. REV. I, I n.l
(1993).
However, determining what that individual's wishes are or would be is susceptible to much debate. In the case of perpetually unconscious patients, this
determination arguably necessitates the deployment of a "fiction." See infra
Part III; see also Byrnes, supra note 2, at 6 n.17.
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994 and Supp. 1994)
(formerly cited as Health Care Decisions Act, Chapter 372, Laws of 1993).
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1991) (repealed and reenacted in its current form by Section I, ch. 372, Acts of Md. 1993).
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-701 to -713 (1991) (amended to current
form by Section 4, ch. 372, Acts of Md. 1993).
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when to withhold a patient's medical procedures with court authorization. 7 The right to die controversy clearly did not abate with the
passage of these laws. Instead, the battleground merely expanded to
include the judicial forum.
Attention turned to the controversy in Mack v. Mack,8 which
culminated with Maryland's highest court writing three separate
opinions interpreting and applying Maryland's Guardian Statute. 9
Mack involved the disputed guardianship of a persistently vegetative
patient. One of the potential guardians sought to have life-sustaining
procedures terminated, the other did not. In Mack, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that there must be clear and convincing
evidence of a patient's intent to refuse life-sustaining procedures,
that this standard was not met by the facts of the case, and consequently, that sustenance could not be removed. lO
. While the decision in Mack established that a patient does have
the right to refuse artificial sustenance, it also made clear that
Maryland's laws were in need of revision. II Mack revealed certain
inconsistencies in Maryland's law. For example, the Living Will
Statute was narrower than the Guardian Statute in that it did not
allow the withholding of artificial sustenanceP Mack required Maryland courts to demand clear and convincing evidence 13 of a persistently unconscious patient's prior intent to terminate life-sustaining
procedures before authorizing a guardian's decision to withhold life
support. 14 This new standard of proof arguably limits the utility of
the Guardian Statute.
The decision in Mack soon caught the attention of the Maryland
legislature. Ultimately, the enactment of the HCDA largely repealed
and modified the statutes on which the decision in Mack was based. IS
Under the new Advance Directives Statute,16 a surrogate may make
decisions without court oversight unless another party petitions for
an injunction. 17 Under the new Guardian Statute,18 a court may

7. One of the crucial issues in Mack proved to be defining what court authorization
requires.
S. 329 Md. ISS, 618 A.2d 744 (1993).
9. See infra notes 106-0S and accompanying text.
10. Mack, 329 Md. at IS8, 61S A.2d at 744.
11. [d. at 198, 222, 61S A.2d at 749, 761.
12. See, e.g., id. at 213, 61S A.2d at 756; see generally supra notes 5-6.
13. Only four judges favored this standard, three judges would have adopted a
more relaxed approach. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 19S, 61S A.2d 744 (1993).
14. Mack, 329 Md. at 207, 61S A.2d at 754.
15. See generally MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -61S (1994 and Supp.
1994).
16. [d.
17. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-70S(c)(2) (1993 and Supp. 1994); accord
Mack, 329 Md. at 239-40, 61S A.2d 769-70 (Chasanow, J., concurring in part
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prospectively authorize certain guardians to make decisions regarding
a patient's treatment without further court intervention into the
decision making process. 19 Further, even if court authorization is
necessary, clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent is
only preferable, not necessary, and authorization may be based upon
clear and convincing evidence of the patient's best interests. 2o
I.

THE RIGHT TO DIE

The terms "euthanasia" and "right to die" are often used in
the same context. There are, however, some distinctions. As previously mentioned, the right to die generally attaches to situations
where a person would be kept alive artificially, but for the fact that
it is against the intent or best interests of that patient. 21 Euthanasia,
on the other hand, is directed at ending life that is no longer
beneficial, whether or not artificial means are used to prolong that
life. 22 The action associated with,the invocation of the right to die
involves the removal of whatever artificial means are prolonging the
life, and in some cases, arguably constitutes a passive form of
euthanasia. 23 Passive euthanasia is less frequently sought by conscious
patients as it may involve a relatively slow and painful death. In
contrast, incurring death by an affirmative measure, such as poisoning, is known as active euthanasia, and can be invoked upon a
conscious patient capable of consenting (termed assisted suicide), or
upon perpetually unconscious subjects. 24 In Maryland,25 as in most
jurisdictions, euthanasia is prohibited. 26

18.
19.

20.
21.
22.

23.

24.

and dissenting in part) (stating that "those closest to the patient, if unanimous,
should be able to make the decision to terminate life support without judicial
intervention").
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-701 to -713 (1993 and Supp. 1994).
This is true only where the court considers it appropriate, unless there is a
dispute between members of the same class. See infra Part IV.
See MD. CODE ANN., EST & TRUSTS §§ 13-711 to -713 (1994 and Supp. 1994).
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Webster's Dictionary does not mention the life of the individual, only the
death. It defines euthanasia as "the act or practice of painlessly putting to
death persons suffering from incurable conditions or diseases." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 786 (1971).
This situation occurs specifically when the patient's life-sustaining procedures
are terminated because it is found to be in his best interests, allowing a "good
death." Cf. Byrnes, supra note 2, at 12.
See generally Nancy W. Dickey, Euthanasia, A Concept Whose Time Has
Come?, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 521 (1993); Eugenie Anne Gifford, Artes Moriendi:
Active Euthanasia and the Art of Dying, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1550-51
nn.21-27 (1993); Jim Persels, Forcing the Issue of Physician-Assisted Suicide;
Impact of the Kevorkian Case on the Euthanasia Debate, 14 J. LEGAL MED.
93 (1993); c. Ann Potter, Will the "Right to Die" Become a License to Kill?
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The right to die has developed from both common-law theories 27
and through protections found in the United States Constitution. 28
The well-rooted, common-law doctrine of informed consent focuses
on a patient's right of self-determination and gives rise to the right
to refuse treatment even if that refusal makes death imminent. 29 The
United States Constitution's protection of liberty embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment JO and numerous state constitutional protections have also been held to engender a right to refuse treatment
under the aegis of individual freedom from action by the state. JI
There are different situations in which it is argued that a patient
has the right to die. In instances where a patient is terminally ill and
is kept alive by medical procedures, the right to die is most sacrosanctY If the patient is conscious and able to express his intent to
refuse treatment, his right is most likely to be honored. 33 If, however,
the patient is not terminally ill, or is not conscious and cannot
express an intent to refuse treatment, the situation becomes complicated as various philosophicaP4 and ethicaP5 problems arise. Deciding
whether a persistently vegetative patient's treatment may be terminated, and deciding who is to make that decision, are particularly
troublesome issues.
If a patient is perpetually unconscious, any known rights of
prior self-determination and inviolability must be upheld. J6 As long

25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

The Growth of Euthanasia in America, 19 J. LEGIS. 31 (1993); David R.
Schanker, Of Suicide Machines, Euthanasia Legislation, and the Health Care
Crisis, 68 IND. L.J. 977 (1993).
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611 (1993) (prohibiting euthanasia and
mercy killing).
See Gifford, supra note 24, at 1545 n.4.
For a discussion of Maryland's doctrine, see Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432,
438-39, 379 A.2d 1014, 1018-19 (1977).
See Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188,210-11,618 A.2d 744, 755-56 (1993) (citing
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278, 287, 30405, 331 (1990».
See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 270-71. But cf.
Mack, 329 Md. at 210 n.7, 618 A.2d at 755 n.7.
See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 278-79.
See Mack, 329 Md. at 210-11, 618 A.2d at 755 (citing numerous states that
have found state and federal constitutional bases for the right to die).
See Byrnes, supra note 2, at 8.
The patient's conscious choice will likely be adhered to unless the patient is
incompetent or another person's interest is involved. See Mack, 329 Md. at
210 & n.7, 618 A.2d at 755 & n.7.
The most salient philosophical issue is whether man can "play God." See,
e.g., Byrnes, supra note 2, at 13.
Primarily affected is the set of ethics associated with the medical profession
and its inhering duty to provide aid.
"The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
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as a patient is deemed legally alive, the law will not discard the
patient's known interests, even if that patient will never regain
consciousnessY The quandary is in determining how to carry out
the patient's wishes and protect those rights. Because the patient is
unconscious, there exists no present intent to be ascertained. Either
the individual's intent must be implied to provide an intent with
which a judgment may be effected, or someone must be appointed
to exercise a surrogate judgment.

A.

The Focus of the Right to Die Determination

One way to determine that such a patient would wish to refuse
treatment is to assess the totality of the evidence of the patient's
intent" prior to incompetence. 38 The patient's, intent can be best
demonstrated by a written living will expressly indicating a desire to
refuse or terminate treatment under certain circumstances in the event
of an inability to convey such wishes at that time. 39 If a living will
is not available, then any prior statements or other circumstantial
evidence can be used to determine the true intent of the patient with
regards to receiving or withholding medical procedures. 40 This approach is often labelled as "substituted" judgment because the court
substitutes either the patient's past intent or a construction thereof
in place of a present intent. 41 The problem with the substituted
judgment approach is that in many cases it is difficult to find enough
clear evidence of a patient's intent regarding continuation of procedures to satisfy the requisite standard of proof. 42

37.

38.
39.

40.
41.
42.

decisions." 'Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278
(1990).
See, e.g., In re Westchester County Medical Ctr. on Behalf of O'Connor, 531
N .E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988) (refusing to accept less than the patient's clearly
expressed intent before permitting a surrogate to exercise the patient's right to
refuse treatment).
See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't oj Health, 497 U.S. at 272.
Under Maryland's former living will law, there were restrictions as to which
procedures could be refused pursuant to this instrument. The statutory living
will suggested use of the following language:
I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I
be permitted to die naturally with only the administration of medi·
cation, the administration of food and water, and the performance
of any medical procedure that is necessary to provide comfort, care
or alleviate pain.
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602 (1991) (repealed 1993); cj. MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (1994 and Supp. 1994) ("Suggested Forms")
(reprinted infra note 147).
Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 215, 618 A.2d 744, 758 (1993).
Id. at 214-15,618 A.2d at 757.
Further, in the su bjective analysis, there is an inherent degree of fiction
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Alternatively, medical decisions can be made for the patient by
a "surrogate," such as a court appointed guardian. 43 Under this
approach, the patient's personal intent may be expressed by the
surrogate, who is presumed to best know what the patient would
have wanted. 44 In lieu of knowledge of the patient's intent, the
surrogate may base a decision on an assessment of the patient's
subjective best interests. 45 The surrogate judgment approach is criticized because a surrogate has the power to disregard or neglect what
the patient would have wanted, and instead base a decision on his
own considerations. 46
Another possible approach is to make an assessment of the
patient's condition based upon more objective criteria to determine
what is the patient's "best interests. "47 Under this approach, a court
makes a judgment as to the patient's quality of life, based upon
factors such as the cost of treatment and the impact upon the family.48
The main criticism of this objective approach is that a court, rather
than interested parties, determines whether a particular life is worth
continuing. 49 This approach creates a slippery slope that inevitably
leads to a broadening of the relevant considerations to include, and
even predominate, the cost to society of maintaining lives of patients.
To varying degrees, a subjective analysis also incorporates certain
objective factors, and vice versa. Regardless of which approach is
chosen, the pertinent criteria and analyses overlap. What may be
dispositive in one approach may initially seem irrelevant in another,
yet such a factor may enter into the analysis indirectly anywayone's best interest is largely evolved from subjective intent, and
conversely, one usually intends to have done what is in one's best
interest.

43.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

regarding the patient's intent. Because the patient is unconscious, whatever
intent is construed is inaccurate in that it lacks the impact that being in the
situation would actually have had on the patient. Facing death may awaken
the survival instinct in even the most cynical individual. On the other hand,
experiencing the realities of an undignified existence can weaken even the most
stubborn. Nevertheless, for a patient that is, by definition, incapable of forming
intent, it can be argued that "no intent" is the most accurate approximation.
Of course, to the degree that this process is overseen by a court, it ceases to
be true surrogacy because it is the court that makes the real substituted
judgment.
Mack, 329 Md. at 214, 618 A.2d at 757.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't oj Health, 497 U.S. at 272 (1990).
See Mack, 329 Md. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757 (the court emphasized that
"the 'substituted judgment' label is a misnomer").
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't oj Health, 497 U.S. at 272.
The Maryland Guardian Statutes do not look to factors such as financial cost
or impact on the family. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (1994)
(setting forth certain "standards" for the surrogate to consider).
Mack, 329 Md. at 218, 618 A.2d at 759.
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The Refusal of Artificial Sustenance

Further complicating decisions to withhold treatment are the
distinctions that are drawn between the types of aid that can be
administered to or refused by the patient. Artificial treatments are
seen as the most invasive to a person's sanctity and right to selfdetermination,50 and therefore, have been the most susceptible to the
right to refusal. In reality, however, there is a spectrum of treatments
and a continuous gradation in the level of "artificiality" of those
treatments. 51 At one end of the spectrum are invasive surgical procedures to combat illness or disease, while at the other end is the
mere providing of food and water. Defying facile characterization
are procedures such as providing nutrition and hydration through a
nasogastric tube or a gastrostomy.52
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
of refusing medical aid, including artificial nutrition and hydration. 53
The decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 54
concluded that there is a constitutional right, based on the Liberty
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to refuse artificial nutrition
and hydration,ss Nancy Cruzan, the patient, was left in a persistent
vegetative state following a car accident. 56 Medical experts testified
at trial that she was not terminally ill, and could live for another
thirty years. 57 Years after consenting to the implanting of a gastrostomy tube, Nancy's guardians sought its removal. 58 The controversy
made its way to the Missouri Supreme Court, which found an absence
of clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's wishes regarding what
decision she would have made. 59 The court held, therefore, that given
Missouri's strong interest in preserving life, sustenance could not be
withdrawn. 6o

50. Such measures have beert regarded by some._Christian faiths as unnatural, and
thus, able to be refused. Undoubtedly this has greatly influenced the common
law as well as statutory right to die provisions. See, e.g., Wendy Ann Kronmiller, Comment, A Necessary Compromise: The Right to Forego Artificial
Nutrition and Hydration Under Maryland's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, 47
MD. L. REV. 1188,1193-94 & nn.37-44 (1988).
51. [d.
52. This involves a surgical procedure to insert a line directly into the stomach.
See generally Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and
Water?, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17 (1983).
53. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 278-81.
56. Id. at 265.
57. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988).
58. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 265. Lester and
Joyce Cruzan, Nancy's parents, were her co-guardians.
59. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 411. Nancy's parents testified that Nancy
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Although the United States Supreme Court affirmed this decision, it recognized that "a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment"61
and "assume[d] that the United States Constitution would grant a
competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. "62 The Court also recognized the validity
of a state's "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life,"6$
which may be manifested "through the imposition of heightened
evidentiary requirements."64 While the Court noted that the case did
not turn on the existence of a protected liberty interest, a majority
of the Justices clearly stated that the right exists, and that it similarly
extends to artificial nutrition and hydration. 65
C.

Standards oj Evidence

Associated with the determination of which factors 66 should be
the focus of the right to die analysis is the question of what
evidentiary standard should be applied in assessing these factors. 67
Cruzan established that states may constitutionally require clear and
convincing evidence of a patient's wishes in determining whether to

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.
66.
67.

had a "somewhat serious conversation with a housemate friend that if she
were sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she could
live at least halfway normally." Id. at 433 (trial court judgment reprinted in
dissenting opinion).
Id. at 424-25.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't oj Health, 497 U.S. at 278.
Id. at 279. Interestingly, the court did not indicate that this right stems from
a right to privacy, as some commentators had expected. See, e.g., Thomas W.
Mayo, Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die, " 49 MD. L. REV. 103 (1990).
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't oj Health, 497 U.S. at 282.
Id. at 282.
The more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more
that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision. We believe that
Missouri may permissibly place an increased risk of an erroneous
decision on those seeking to terminate an incompetent individual's
life-sustaining treatment. An erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the status quo; the possibility of subsequent
developments such as advancements in medical science, the discovery
of new evidence regarding the patient's intent, changes in the law, or
simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the administration
of life-sustaining treatment at least create the potential that a wrong
decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An
erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is
not susceptible of correction.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 279.
See supra Part I.A.
Sometimes, however, the determination of which standard of proof is appro-
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terminate life support. 68 Indeed, most state courts require that these
life and death determinations be supported by clear and convincing
evidence of the relevant facts.69 The relevant facts may include the
terminal or "end-stage" nature of the patient's condition, the patient's past expressions of intent or preferences, and the patient's
overall condition and best interests. 7o However, evidence of prior
expressions of the patient's intent is not always required. 71 Only two
states require clear and convincing evidence of past expressed intentY

68.

69.

70.
71.
72.

priate has been confused with the selection of fa~tors to which the standard is
to apply. This confusion leads to a choice between clear and convincing evidence
of prior intent and it determination of the patient's best interests, presumably
with a preponderance of the evidence standard. The majority opinion in Mack
is an example of this dubious comparison.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 282-84. Cruzan
does not mandate that states use this standard of proof. Id. at 283; see, e.g.,
In re Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1271, 1272 n.19. (Mass.), cert.
denied sub nom., Doe v. Gross, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992) (Massachusetts uses a
preponderance of the evidence standard accompanied by an extra measure of
evidentiary protection provided by "specific findings of fact after 'a careful
review of the evidence."').
The states that have addressed this issue have defined the relevant considerations and evidentiary standards with both statutes and case law. An example
of a fairly explicit statute is Maryland's new Health Care Decisions Act. See
infra Part IV; see generally Byrnes, supra note 2.
Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 208, 618 A.2d 744, 754 (1993). Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, upheld the constitutionality of this requirement, as long as it is supported by a valid state interest, such as the preservation
of life. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-84. Missouri's standard of proof, upheld in
Cruzan, is more rigid, however, than that in most states. See infra note 72.
See Mack, 329 Md. at 215, 618 A.2d at 758.
DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 706 (Ky. 1993).
Id.
In all but two states, Missouri and New York, even when the court
has been unable to precisely determine the express wishes of the
patient, it has allowed the patient's family, or the patient's guardian,
to exercise substituted judgment as to what the patient would wish ....
[Missouri and New York] require clear and convincing evidence thilt
the incompetent person, while competent, expressed the desire that
such treatment be refused in the circumstances presented.
Id. (citations omitted). Other states have developed their own set of criteria.
See, e.g., In re Moorhouse, 593 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
The three tests established by the Court are as follows and apply to
an elderly, formerly competent but presently incompetent nursinghome resident with severe and permanent mental and physical impairments .and a life expectancy of one year or less. Under the
"subjective" test, when it is clear that the patient would have refused
the treatment under the circumstances involved, life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from the patient. The limitedobjective test applies when the patient has not unequivocally expressed
his desires before becoming incompetent. Here, life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from a patient when there is
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Statutes Governing the Right to Die

Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan; the right
to die controversy continued to draw much attention in state legislatures and courts. Most states already had laws providing for living
wills 73 and surrogate decision making,74 but Cruzan provided direction
to the dialogue in state legislatures. In Maryland, the area of law
governing the right to die has seen constant legislation and amendment in the past few years. The two statutes that were applicable in
Mack v. Mack, both now substantially repealed or modified, were
known as the Living Will Statute and the Guardianship Statute. 75
Maryland's Living Will Statute, formerly sections 5-601 through
5-614 of the Health-General Article of the Maryland Code, enacted
in 1985, enabled anyone qualified to write a will to also write a
declaration directing the withholding of life-sustaining procedures in
the event of a terminal illness. 76 This law, explicitly precluded,
however, application to declarations to withhold "food, water, or of
such medication and medical procedures as are necessary to provide
comfort, care and to alleviate pain. "77 At the same time, the law
provided that it was "cumulative and may not be construed to impair

73.

74.

75.
76.
77.

some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused the
treatment and the decision maker is satisfied that it is clear that the
burdens of the patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh
the benefits of that life for him and that the treatment would merely
prolong the patient's suffering. Under the "pure-objective" test, applicable when there is no trustworthy evidence that the formerly
competent patient would have declined the treatment, the net burdens
of the patient's life with the treatment should clearly and markedly
outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from life.
Id. at 1259 (citations omitted); see also In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1180
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992), cert. denied, 610 N.E.2d. 1264 (III. 1993). Further, some
states will apply the best interests test in the case of patients who were never
competent to express an intent. See In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 639
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
[A]s applied to immature minors and other never-competent patients,
the substituted judgment standard is inappropriate because it cannot
be ascertained what choice the patient would have made if competent.
We therefore conclude that, where the patient has never been competent, the decision-making test that better guides the surrogate is the
best interests standard.
Id. at 639-40 (citations omitted).
See generally JONATHON J. RIKOUN, HANDLING YOUR FIRST HEALTH CARE
PROXY, LIVING WILL, AND DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY (1992) (Practicing
Law Institute). In 1992, 45 states had statutes that recognized some form of a
living will. Id.
See generally GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN AUTHORIZING
OR WITHHOLDING LIFE SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT (1991).
See Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 212, 618 A.2d744, 756 (1993).
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(a) (1990) (repealed 1993).
Id. § 5-605(1) (repealed 1993).
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or supersede any legal right or responsibility that any person may
have to effect the initiation, continuation, withholding, or withdrawal
of life-sustaining procedures. "78
Opinions by Maryland's Attorney General construed this statute
to be self-executing only with regard to terminal illness and lifesustaining procedures other than food and water. 79 Those opinions
also acknowledged a person's constitutional right to refuse sustenance. 80 The Attorney General's opinions indicated that a declarant
could add language to a living will regarding the withholding of
treatment under other conditions, including the withholding of artificially administered food and water. 81
Maryland's Living Will Statute82 was only applicable where a
patient had the foresight to write a living will; as a result, Maryland's
Guardianship .Statute was pertinent to most cases. 83 This statute
provided for the appointment of a guardian for certain patients,84
and allowed guardians to determine whether to withhold or withdraw
medical or other professional care, including counselling, treatment~
or service. 8s However, the guardian's decision was subject to court
approval if the course of action chosen involved a substantial risk
to the patient. 86
Both laws were amended in 1990, and in contrast to the 1988
amendment to the Living Will Statute87 that explicitly precluded

78. 'd. § 5-610(1) (repealed (993).
79. 73 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 162, 180-83 (1988).
80. 'd.; see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278
(1990).
81. Op. Md. Att'y Gen., No. 90-044 (Sept. 24, (990) (unbound).
82. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN., §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990) (repealed (993).
83. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS §§ 13-701 to -710 (1990) (repealed (993).
84. 'd. § 13-705(a). Former § 13-705(b) set forth the grounds required for appointment:
A guardian of the person shall be appointed if the court determines
from clear and convincing evidence that a person lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person, including provisions for health care,
food, clothing, or shelter, because of any mental disability, senility,
other mental weakness, disease, habitual drunkenness, or addiction to
drugs, and that no less restrictive form of intervention is available
which is consistent with the person's welfare and safety.
'd. § 13-705(b). Former § 13-707(a) accorded priorities of appointment to: "(I)
a person, agency, or corporation nominated by the disabled person ... ; (2)
His spouse; and (3) His parents." 'd. § 13-707(a).
85. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(b)(8)(ii), (iii) (1991) (amended 1993).
86. Former § 13-708(c) provided:
[WI here a medical procedure involves, or would involve, a substantial
risk to the life of a disabled person, the court must authorize a
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termination of artificial sustenance, the 1990 amendment expressly
allowed the guardian to approve the withholding of treatment, but
was silent on the issue of sustenance. 88 Until Mack, however, no
cases had construed whether the 1990 amendment meant that sustenance could be terminated by either a living will or court authorization.
II.

THE INSTANT CASE

Due to the ambiguity of the Guardianship Statute, it was not
surprising that the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari
in Mack. 89 Ronald Mack was born in 1962 and, in 1980, married his
wife, Deanna. 90 In 1983, while stationed in California with the Army,
Ronald was "involved in an automobile accident in which he suffered
massive brain injuries. "91 He was thereafter in a persistent vegetative
state, totally "incapable of cognitive activity. "92 Ronald's arms and
legs were moderately spastic, and he was incontinent. 93 A tracheotomy
was performed to remove secretions from his lungs, and he had to
be fed through a gastrostomy tube. 94 Ronald, however, was not
experiencing pain. 95
In 1983, Ronald was moved from California to a hospital in
Maryland in order to be near his family.96 The next year, Deanna

87.
88.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

guardian's consent or approval for:
(1) The medical procedure;
(2) Withholding the medical procedure; or
(3) Withdrawing the medical procedure that involves, or would
involve, a substantial risk to the life of the disabled person.
MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c) (1990) (amended 1993).
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1988) (amended 1990).
An opinion of the Maryland Attorney General noted:
As amended by this statute, MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13708(b)(8) now expressly empowers a guardian to approve the 'withholding' or 'withdrawing' of 'medical or other professional care,
counsel, treatment or service.' However, 'where a medical procedure
involves, or would involve, a substantial risk to the life of disabled
person,' the guardianship court must itself 'authorize a guardian's
consent or approval for' a procedure, the withholding of a procedure,
or the withdrawing of a procedure.
Op. Md. Att'y Gen., No. 90-044 (Sept. 24, 1990) (unbound).
Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993).
[d. at 191, 618 A.2d at 746.
[d. at 192, 618 A.2d at 746.
[d. The circuit court found "no medically reasonable expectation of recovery."
[d. at 192-93, 618 A.2d at 746-47.
[d. at 192, 618 A.2d at 746.
[d.
[d. at 193, 618 A.2d at 747.
[d. at 192, 618 A.2d at 747.
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was appointed Ronald's guardian in Maryland and moved to Florida
where she lived with another man for about five years. 97 Deanna
then sought and obtained appointment as guardian by· decree of a
court in Florida, and was discharged under the Maryland appointment. 98 In 1991, Deanna expressed an interest in having Ronald's
treatment terminated. 99 Soon thereafter, Ronald's father, Mr. Mack,
filed an application with the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland for a temporary restraining order preventing
Deanna from moving Ronald to a hospital in Florida. 100 A preliminary
injunction was entered and Mr. Mack then petitioned the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County to have himself appointed as Ronald's
guardian. 101 Deanna cross-petitioned for guardianship and requested
termination of Ronald's sustenance. I02 The circuit court ruled that
the Florida court lacked jurisdiction to appoint Ronald's guardian
and instead appointed a temporary guardian pending trial. 103
At trial, the circuit court resolved the issue of guardianship and
the termination of sustenance. The court appointed Mr. Mack as
Ronald's guardian,l04 and found that there was no clear and con-.
vincing evidence of Ronald's intent to have sustenance terminated.
The court held, therefore, that sustenance could not be withdrawn
at the request of the guardian. 105
..On appeal, the majority of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
agreed that the Florida court's appointment of a guardian was
invalid. 106 The court also vacated the appointment of Mr. Mack as
Ronald's guardian, finding that the appointment had been based on
erroneous criteria. 107 The majority upheld the lower court's denial of
the request to withhold life support. I08 Nonetheless, the majority

97.
98.
99.
100.
IO\.
102.
103.

104.

105.
106.

107.

108.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 193, 618 A.2d at 747.
at 193-94, 618 A.2d at 747.
at 194, 618 A.2d at 747.

at 195, 618 A.2d at 748.
at 194-95,618 A.2d at 747. The circuit court appointed Edward J. Gilliss,
Ronald's counsel, as a temporary guardian. [d. at 195,618 A.2d at 747.
Despite Deanna's higher priority under former § 13-707(a), she was not
appointed as guardian. The appointment was based primarily on Deanna's
desire not to continue the administration of food and water, which the court
found to be in contravention of the objectives of Maryland law. [d. at 196,
618 A.2d at 748.
[d. at 195-96, 618 A.2d at 748.
[d. at 200, 618 A.2d at 750.
The circuit court based the determination of guardianship on the fact that
Deanna intended to withdraw Ronald's life support, ostensibly in contravention
of the objectives of Maryland law. [d. at 196,618 A.2d at 748; see supra note
104.
Five judges refused to withhold life support. Judge Chasanow agreed with the
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accepted a basis for the right to die that would aid in interpreting
the statutory provisions at issue. This basis was supported by the
common-law rights of informed consent lO9 and self-determination. llo
A determination as to whether the right to die is based on the
Constitution or on the common law was irrelevant to the court's
decision. III The court cited other jurisdictions that similarly found
no need to address the constitutional issue. 1I2 The court noted,
however, that "all of the [the Supreme Court] Justices, save Justice
Scalia, flatly stated or strongly implied that a liberty interest under
the fourteenth amendment guarantees a protected right to refuse life
sustaining hydration and nutrition. "113
The court of appeals' holding that artificial sustenance could be
refused or removed relied heavily on the Attorney General's opinion
that "there is no difference, as a matter of law, between artificially
administered sustenance and other forms of life sustaining treatment." 114 The court distinguished the Guardian Statute from the
Living Will Statute, which precluded the refusal of food and water. 115
In light of the authorities, the court remarked that "absent a statutory
exclusion" in former section 13-708, sustenance could be withheld
or withdrawn under the Guardian Statute. 116
Stating that "[t]he statute does not, however, supply the standards or guidelines for a court's exercise of the power to grant or
withhold authorization," 117 the court recognized a common-law right
to die analysis applicable to the procedural guidelines in former
section 13-708. 118 The court then focused on establishing the proper
guidelines and standards to be applied in right to die cases. 119
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that because the right
to die was one of self-determination, a rule of "substituted judgment" must apply, wherein the guardian or court supplies an incompetent patient's past intent regarding the withdrawal or withholding

result, but dissented with respect to the standard employed by the other four
judges. Mack, 329 Md. at 233, 618 A.2d at 766-67. Judge McAuliffe and Chief
Judge Murphy dissented. [d. at 222, 618 A.2d at 761.
109. [d. at 210, 618 A.2d at 755.
110. [d. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757-58.
111. [d. at 211, 618 A.2dat 756.
112. [d.

II 3. [d.
114. [d. at 213, 618 A.2d at757 (quoting 73 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 179, 181 (1988».

115. "[T]he unqualified language used by the General Assembly in the 1990 amendment of [Estates & Trusts] § l3-708(b)(8) and (c) stands in stark contrast [to
that of the living will statute]." [d. at 214, 618 A.2d at 757.
116. [d.
117. [d. at 212, 618 A.2d at 756.
118. [d. at 215, 618 A.2d at 758.
119. [d. at 215-17, 618 A.2d at 757-59.
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of life support. 120 The court further determined that such substituted
judgment must be based upon clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's past intent. 121 The court applied this high standard of proof
because it was utilized by the "overwhelming majority" of states. 122
Applying that standard to the facts, the court affirmed the lower
court's denial of authorization to withhold life support procedures.123
Finally, the court rejected the proposed best interests standard,
irrespective of the pertinent standard of proof. The court elaborated
on the problems inherent in the best interests test,124 maintaining that
the legislature did not intend for that standard to apply. 125
The dissent, however, took issue with the clear and convincing
standard as applied by the majority in the authorization of a guardian's request to terminate life support. 126 First, the dissent argued
that the substituted judgment approach "comes into play when the
ward has made no prior statements bearing on the issue" of intentY7
Second, the dissent argued that the court's analysis of the patient's
intent was unnecessarily "limited to . . . the intent the ward may
have formed when competent,"128 to the exclusion of other factors
that should be taken into consideration in the absence of explicit
expressions of intent.
III.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
The court could have held that construing former section 13-708
in para materia with former section 5-605 precluded the possibility
of removal of artificial nutrition and hydration. 129 The court recog120. Id. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757.
121. Id. at 207-09, 618 A.2d at 753-55. The court likened the request to withdraw·
or withhold life support to a request for punitive damages in a tort case, and
a request for sterilization of an incompetent ward, both of which have been
held subject to the clear and convincing evidence standard. Id. at 208, 618
A.2d at 754.
122. Id. at 208-09, 618 A.2d at 754-55. Curiously, the court cited New Jersey and
Illinois as two of the jurisdictions that require "clear and convincing evidence
that the ward's decision would have been to forego life support." Id. Clearly,
that is incorrect. See supra note 72.
123. Mack, 329 Md. at 217,618 A.2d at 759. "[The trial court's] fact findings are
not clearly erroneous. This is a case in which we do not know what decision,
if any, the patient had made or would make." Id.
124. One such problem includes the theoretical fallacy in attributing any interests
whatsoever to someone who is permanently unconscious. Id. at 220, 618 A.2d
at 760 (citing 73 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 162, 189-90 (1988); In re Peter, 529 A.2d
419, 425 (N.J. 1987». Another problem is the slippery slope potential of the
best interests test. Id. at 221-22 n.ll, 618 A.2d at 761 n.ll; see also supra
text accompanying notes 47-49.
125. Mack, 329 Md. at 217-22, 618 A.2d at 759-61.
126. Id. at 223-29, 618 A.2d at 762-65 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 223, 618 A.2d at 762.
128. Id. at 228, 618 A.2d at 764.
129. It should also be noted, on the other hand, that the court could have merely
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nized the implications of Cruzan, however, and avoided basing its
decision on a rule that would prove constitutionally challengeable.
More confounding was the court's assertion that the Guardian
Statute did not actually rely on the guardian's judgment in this
paramount determination, but instead used the court's assessment of
the patient's judgment. 13o Even accepting the proposition that the
legislature intended the court, rather than the guardian, to make such
determinations,131 the court's statement that the patient is entrusted
to the court holds only partially true under the rule in Mack. 132 Only
if the guardian invokes the court's oversight, by opting for the
withholding or withdrawal of sustenance as opposed to initiation or
continuation,133 is clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent

,130.
131.

132.

133.

allowed Florida to appoint Deanna as guardian. Sufficient contacts, however,
is a well established requisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over the person.
Such contacts were lacking in this case, as Ronald resided in Maryland. It may
be argued that this rule could be surreptitiously avoided by merely attaining
guardianship in Maryland and then moving the ward to another state to obtain
the benefit of its laws. Although this too required court authorization, the
guardian could be disingenuous as to his intent. MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 13-708(b), (c) (1991) (amended 1993) ("The right to custody of the
disabled person and to establish his place of abode within and without the
State, provided there is court authorization for any change in the classification
of abode .... ").
Mack, 329 Md. at 212, 618 A.2d at 756. "Ronald, as a ward of the court, is
entitled to plenary protection of the court." [d.
Indeed, a recent poll indicated that there is a clear consensus in America that
the family should make the decision, rather than the court.
An overwhelming 88 percent of Americans say the family should
decide whether to end artificial life support when an individual is in
a coma without hope of recovery and has left no instructions on
personal wishes. Only 8 percent said doctors should make the decision;
I percent said the courts should decide, and no one selected the state.
[d. at 248, 618 A.2d at 774 (Chasanow, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting M. Coyle, How Americans View High Court, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 26, 1990, at 36).
The court later admitted this inconsistency in its opinion:
From the standpoint of initiating a request to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment, the judgment of the guardian or applicant for guardianship
is truly substituted for that of the ward. But, from the standpoint of
whether the treatment is to be withdrawn, the "substituted judgment"
label is a misnomer. The judgmept of the guardian is not accepted
by the court in lieu of the judgment of the ward. Rather, because the
right is one of self-determination, the inquiry focuses on whether the
ward had determined, or would determine, that treatment should be
withdrawn under the circumstances of the case.
[d. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757. The clear implication is that the'right to selfdetermination is not involved unless treatment is sought to be withdrawn.
Initiation would tend to occur well before a court could take action to authorize,
and continuation would ordinarily require no authorization. See infra note 162
and accompanying text.
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patient's intent required. To the contrary, the patient's intent could
be ignored at the option of the guardian by not involving the court
at all. As a result, the patient's intent would be carefully evaluated
only under certain circumstances. If the guardian allowed treatment
to continue against the patient's intent, the court would not be
involved. 134 Thus, the Mack court reduced the role of the guardian
to an arbitrary invoker of judicial determinations as to the patient's
treatment.
The plain language of former section 13-708 provided that the
court need only "authorize" the guardian's decision to withhold or
withdraw sustenance. 135 If the legislature intended a full-blown evidentiary determination, it would have so indicated. The term "authorize" is defined as: "To empower; to give a right or authority to
act. To endow with authority or effecting legal power, warrant, or
right .... To permit a thing to be done in the future . ... "136 The
court provided no cogent reason as to how the term "authorize"
translated into a disenfranchising supervision of the guardian's decisions. Indeed, in the case of an incompetent patient on life support,
the provisions for the appointment of a guardian are meaningless
because the court must make the ultimate decision anyway. More
logically indicated by the word "authorize" would have been a
determination by the court that the guardian has no improper motives
in making a decision, and has a sufficient relationship to the patient
to have developed a decision based on clear and convincing evidence,
as is the case in other jurisdictions. 137
Moreover, requiring clear and convincing evidence of a patient's
prior intent was not implicit in the statute. 138 In fact, the test
employed by the court unnecessarily focused upon the existence of
evidence that is not likely to be present in many cases. The result is
that anyone who left behind little memorable evidence of an opinion
on the subject of a dignified death would have their case resolved

134.
135.
136.
137.

Mack, 329 Md. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757.

Id.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
See, e.g., In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
We therefore hold that, in general, judicial involvement in the decision
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment on behal f of a minor
or other incompetent patient need occur only when the parties directly
concerned disagree about treatment, or other appropriate reasons are
established for the court's involvement.
Id. at 639; see also In re of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (although a decisi.on must be based on clear and convincing evidence,
the surrogate makes the decision in an informal forum).
138. See generally, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1991) (repealed
1993); MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS §§ 13-701 to -713 (1991) (amended
1993).
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the same way, despite their actual intent. It is arbitrary to ignore the
hopelessness and severity of the condition and its effect upon the
patient's family; indeed, it is illogical to regard these factors as
irrelevant to the patient's putative intent. Certainly, the primary
indicia should be any prior expressed intent of the patient, but a
reasonable approach would also admit evidence of the current situation itself. It may be argued that by recognizing this, the objective
best interests test is approximated in a case with sparse subjective
indicia. That does not make the subjective test flawed, however, it
merely points out its fictitious aspect-when the patient is perpetually
unconscious, subjective intent is non-existent. 139
The court was correct in intimating that lawmaking is best left
to the legislature;l40 nonetheless, by taking affirmative measures instituting a "pro-life" bias, the court did effect a change in the law.141
With its decision in Mack, the Court of Appeals of Maryland put
the ball squarely in the legislature's court. 142 The legislature responded
quickly, enacting the Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 which
became effective as of October 1, 1993.
IV.

THE IMPACT OF THE HCDA
The preamble of the HCDA states:
Whereas, the State is constitutionally permitted to enact
reasonable safeguards to assure that health care decisions
made by others or on behalf of an incapacitated patient are
in keeping with the wishes of the patient or are in the best
interests of the patient .... 143

A.

Advance Directives and Surrogate Decisions

Section 5-602 of Maryland's Health-General Article allows a
competent individual to make a written or oral advance directive to
guide health care decisions in the event of incompetency.l44 Unlike
the former Living Will Statute, the current provisions allow for the
139. The test employed by the court depends on the fiction that the patient's past
indications correspond to what he would want to do now. The court was
unwilling to admit that a patient in a persistent vegetative state cannot have
intent, although it may be constructed for him. There is no reason why the
construction chosen in Mack would better vindicate the patient's rights than a
broader or more objective assessment of his best interests. For a critical analysis
of the variety of judgments employing this fiction, see Louise Harmon, Falling
Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted JUdgment, 100
YALE L.J. I (1990).
140. Mack, 329 Md. at 198, 222, 618 A.2d at 749, 761.
141. Jd. at 222, 618 A.2d at 760-61.
142. The court held that the "'best interest' standard for withdrawal of life support
involves a quality-of-life judgment which ... should be made only under
guidelines established by the General Assembly." Jd. at 198, 618 A.2d at 749.
143. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994).
144. /d. § 5-602 (1994 and Supp. 1994).
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refusal of nutrition and hydration.l 45 Two model forms are suggested
in section 5-603. 146 Form I is a Living Will. It provides a range of
options concerning possible courses of treatment and suggests that
the individual tailor these options to different circumstances. 147 Form
II is comprised of two optional parts, the first directing the appointment of a health care agent to make decisions on behalf of the

145. Id. § 5-601(m)(2) (1994) (stating that "a life sustaInIng proceuure includes
artificially administering hydration and nutrition").
146. Id. § 5-603 (1994 and Supp. 1994).
147.
Form I
Living Will
(Optional Form)
If I am not able to make an informed decision regarding my
health care, 1 direct my health care providers to follow my instructions
as set forth below. (initial those statements you wish to be included
in the document and cross through those statements which do not
apply.)
a. If my death from a terminal condition is imminent and even·
if life-sustaining procedures are used there is no reasonable expectation
of my recovery- .
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures,
including the administration of nutrition and hydration artificially.
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures,
except that, if 1 am unable to take food by mouth, 1 wish to receive
nutrition and hydration artificially.
__ I direct that, even in a terminal condition, 1 be given· all available
medical treatment in accordance with accepted health care standards.
b. 1flam in a persistent vegetative state, that is if 1 am not
conscious and am not aware of my environment nor able to interact
with others, and there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery
within a medically appropriate period__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures,
including the administration of nutrition and hydration artificially.
__
. 1 direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures,
except that if 1 am unable to take in food by mouth, I wish to receive
nutrition and hydration artificially.
__ I direct that 1 be given all available medical treatment in accordance with accepted health care standards.
c. If 1 am pregnant my agent shall follow these specific instructions: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

By signing below, I indicate that 1 am emotionally and mentally
competent to make this living will and that 1 understand its purpose
and effect. ...
MD. CODE ANN, HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (Supp. 1994).
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individual in the event of incompetency.148 The second part details

148.
Form II
Advance Directive
Part A
Appointment of Health Care Agent
(Optional Form)
(Cross through if you do not want to appoint a health care agent to
make health care decisions for you. If you do want to appoint an
agent, cross through any items in the form that you do not want to
ap!,ly.)
(I) I,
, residing at _ _ _ _ _ __
appoint the following individual as my agent to make health care
decisions for me
(Full Name, Address, and Telephone Number)
Optional: If this agent is unavailable or is unable or unwilling to act
as my agent, then I appoint the following person to act in this capacity
(Full Name, Address, and Telephone Number)
(2) My agent has full power and authority to make health care
decisions for me, including the power to:
a. Request, receive, and review any information, oral or written,
regarding my physical or mental health, including, but not limited to,
medical and hospital records, and consent to disclosure of this information;
b. Employ and discharge my health care providers;
c. Authorize my admission to or discharge from (including
transfer to another facility) any hospital, hospice, nursing home, adult
home, or other medical care facility; and
d. Consent to the provision, withholding, or withdrawal of
health care, including, in appropriate circumstances, life-sustaining
procedures.
(3) The authority .of my agent is subject to the following provisions
and limitations:
(4) My agent's authority becomes operative (initial the option that
applies):
__ When my attending physician and a second physician determine
that I am incapable of making an informed decision regarding my
health care; or
__ When this document is signed.
(5) My agent is to make health care decisions for me based on the
health care instructions I give in this document and on my wishes as
otherwise known to my agent. If my wishes are unknown or unclear,
my agent is to make health care decisions for me in accordance with
my best interest, to be determined by my agent after considering the
benefits, burdens, and risks that might result from a given treatment
or course of treatment, or from the withholding or withdrawal of a
treatment or course of treatment.
(6) My agent shall not be liable for the costs of care based solely on
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in advance the specific health care instructions for that appointed
agent to follow in such an event. 149

this authorization.
By signing below, I indicate that I am emotionally and mentally
competent to make this appointment of a health care agent and that
I understand its purpose and effect. ...
MD. CODE ANN, HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (Supp. 1994).
149.
Part B
Advance Medical Directive
Health Care Instructions
(Optional Form)
(Cross through if you do not want to complete this portion of the
form. If you do want to complete this portion of the form, initial
those statements you want to be included in the document and cross
through those statements that do not apply.)
If I am incapable of making an informed decision regarding my
health care, I direct my health care providers to follow my instructions
as set forth below. (Initial all those that apply.)
(I) If my death from a terminal condition is imminent and even
if life-sustaining procedures are used there is no reasonable expectation
of my recovery__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures,
including the administration of nutrition and hydration artificially.
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures,
except that if I am unable to take food by mouth, I wish to receive
nutrition and hydration artificially.
(2) If I am in a persistent vegetative state, that is, if I am not
conscious and am not aware of my environment or able to interact
with others, and there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures,
including the administration of nutrition and hydration artificially.
__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures,
except that if I am unable to take food by mouth, I wish to receive
nutrition and hydration artificially.
(3) If I have an end-stage condition, that is a condition caused
by injury, disease, or illness, as a result of which I have suffered
severe and permanent deterioration indicated by incompetency and
complete physical dependency and for which, to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty, treatment of the irreversible condition would be
medically ineffective__ I direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures,
including the administration of nutrition and hydration artificially.
__ 1 direct that my life not be extended by life-sustaining procedures,
except that if I am unable to take food by mouth, I wish to receive
nutrition and hydration artificially.
__ I direct that no matter what my condition, medication not be
given to me to relieve pain and suffering, if it would shorten my
remaining life.
__ I direct that no matter what my condition, I be given all available
medical treatment in accordance with accepted health care standards.
(4) If I am pregnant, my decision concerning life-sustaining
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Section 5-605 further allows a surrogate to make decisions regarding an incompetent patient's medical care, even if a health care
agent was not nominated by the patient. 150 The surrogate is selected
from an enumerated class l51 of the highest rank available. 152 "Any
person authorized to make health care decisions for another under
this section shall base those decisions on the wishes of the patient l53
or, if the wishes of the patient are unknown or unclear, on the
patient's best interest."154 The factors to be considered by the surrogate in these determinations are explicitly listed. 155 A health care
provider may petition the court to prevent the withholding or with-

procedures shall be modified as follows:
(5) I direct (in the following space, indicate any other instructions
regarding receipt or nonreceipt of any health care)

150.
151.

152.

153.

154.

By signing below, I indicate that I am emotionally and mentally
competent to make this advance directive and that I understand the
purpose and effect of this document. ...
MD. CODE ANN, HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (Supp. 1994).
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (1994).
Those classes are: "(i) A guardian for the patient, if one has been appointed;
(ii) The patient's spouse; (iii) An adult child of the patient; (iv) A parent of
the patient; (v) An adult [sibling]; or (vi) A [qualified] friend or other relative
of the patient. ... " MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (1994).
Section 5-605(a)(l) provides that the surrogate is unavailable when:
(i) After reasonable inquiry, a health care provider is unaware of
the existence of a surrogate decision maker;
(ii) After reasonable inquiry, a health care provider cannot ascertain the whereabouts of the surrogate decision maker;
(iii) A surrogate decision maker has not responded in a timely
manner, taking into account the health care needs of the indi vidual,
to a written or oral message from a health care provider;
(iv) A surrogate decision maker is incapacitated; or
(v) A surrogate decision maker is' unwilling to make decisions
concerning the health of the individual.
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (1994).
The factors to be considered are: (I) the "current diagnosis and prognosis with
and without treatment at issue"; (2) "expressed preferences regarding the ...
treatment at issue or of similar treatments"; (3) "relevant religious and moral
beliefs and personal values"; (4) behaviors and attitudes regarding medical
treatment; (5) "reactions to ... similar treatment for another individual"; and
(6) "expressed concerns about the effect on the family or intimate friends."
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(2) (1994).
The considerations relevant to the patient's best interests are: (I) the effects
of treatment on the disabled person; (2) the pain involved in withholding or
withdrawing treatment; (3) the degree of insult to the patient's dignity caused
by treatment or its withdrawal; (4) the effect of treatment on life expectancy;
(5) the effect of treatment on the prognosis; (6) the risks and benefits of the
treatment or its withdrawal; and (7) the religious beliefs and basic values of
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drawal of a life-sustaining procedure if he believes such an instruction
to be inconsistent with generally accepted standards of patient care.'56
Others may petition the court to enjoin a request for withholding or
withdrawal if such a request is not authorized by law.'57

B.

A Guardian's Decision Making
The HCDA also significantly modified Title 13 of the Estates &
Trusts Article. Section 13-707 now provides that the designated health
care agent, as defined by title 5 of the Health-General Article, is
second in priority in the appointment of a guardian.'58 Section 13708(c)(2) was added, providing that "the court may, upon such
conditions as the court considers appropriate, '59 authorize a guardian
to make a decision regarding medical procedures that involve a
substantial risk to life without further court authorization," if the
disabled person executed an advance directive allowing a guardian to
make decisions, or if the guardian is a spouse, parent, adult child,
or adult sibling of the disabled person.'60 In all other cases, "the
court must authorize a guardian's consent or approval" for withdrawing or withholding medical procedures that would involve a
substantial risk to the patient's life.'6' Court authorizations are to be
based upon clear and convincing evidence of what the patient would

155.

156.
157.
158.

159.

160.

161.

the patient.· MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(l) (1994). Neither the
financial burden nor the impact upon the patient's family or loved ones are
included among these factors.
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(2) (1994). Two physicians must
certify the incapacity of the patient, id. § 5-606(a), and two physicians must
also certify that the patient is in a terminal condition, or has an end-stage
condition, id. § 5-606(b).
[d. § 5-612(a).
[d. § 5-612(b).
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-707(a)(2) (Supp. 1994). The highest
priority remains an entity previously nominated by the patient to be a guardian.
[d. § 13-707(a)(l) (1993 and Supp. 1994).
This appears to leave the court with the discretion to ascertain whether the
surrogate has ulterior motives, or to determine whether there is any other
reason his judgment would not be trustworthy.
MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c)(2) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
Section 13-708(c)(l) was also modified to clarify that court authorization of
the decision may not be necessary: "[EJxcept as provided in [§ 13-708(c)(2)],
... the court must authorize the guardian's consent or approval." [d. § 13708(c)(l) (emphasis added). Although it could be interpreted that § 13-708
(c)(3) requires the court to authorize, by engaging in its own analysis of the
patient's wishes or best interests (following § 13-711 through § 13-713), all
requests to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures, such an interpretation would render the addition of subsection (c)(2) and the modification of
subsection (c)(l) meaningless and of no effect. Thus, subsection (c)(3) appears
to invoke the court's oversight of the actual decision only when the exception
in (c)(2) does not apply.
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c)(l) (1993).
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do if competent; 162 however, if this substituted judgment cannot be
made, authorization may be based upon clear and convincing evidence
of what is in the patient's best interests. 163
C.

Application to Mack v. Mack

The HCDA bolstered individuals' ability to rely on others to
appropriately act on their behalf in the event that they are unable
to do so, thereby assuring a greater degree of prospective autonomy.
Clearly, this has an impact on the potential future disposition of the
Mack case. l64 Under the new law, Deanna Mack could proceed either
under title 5 or 13 to make decisions regarding Ronald's treatment.
Although Ronald never made an advance directive or appointed a
health care agent, Deanna would be entitled to make surrogate
decisions regarding his health care. Clearly, Deanna, as Ronald's
wife, would have priority over Ronald's father in the decision making
process. 165 Section 5-605(2) provides priority for the patient's guardian; if there is no guardian appointed, the second choice is the
patient's spouse, the third choice is an adult child, and the fourth
choice is a parent. 166
Deanna would be required to act upon Ronald's wishes, considering such factors as his expressions, beliefs, and attitudes regarding
the treatment and other relevant issues. 167 If she found that his wishes
were unclear, she could then base her decision upon a broader
assessment of Ronald's best interests. 168 Although the evidence regarding Ronald's wishes was found to be ambiguous,169 the decision
would still be Deanna's to make. At the least, she could base a
decision to terminate procedures upon her intimate knowledge of
162. Id. § 13-712(b) (Supp. 1994). The factors to be considered by the court in the
substituted judgment are listed in § 13-711(d) and are essentially the same as
those described in § 5-605(c)(2) for consideration of a decision by a surrogate.
Id. § 13-711(d) (1993); see also supra note 153.
163. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-713(a) (Supp. 1994). The considerations
relevant to the patient's best interests are the same as those outlined in § 5605 (c)(2). See supra note 154; MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-711(b)
(Supp. 1994).
164. Section 5-616 provides that the subtitle is "cumulative with existing law on the
right to consent or refuse to consent to medical treatment and doles] not
impair any existing rights." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-616(a) (1994).
165. See supra note 151.
166. There would thus be no dispute among members of a class with equal priority
because Deanna would be the only member of that class, and Ronald's father
would have lower priority under the statute. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTHGEN. § 5-605(b)(l) (1994).
167. See supra notes 153, 154.
168. See supra note 154.
169. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 217, 618 A.2d 744, 758-59 (1993).
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Ronald and his best interests. Only upon petItIOn by a concerned
party to enjoin the termination would a court become involved in
assessing whether the provisions of the law authorized that termination, that is, whether the patient's wishes or best interests dictated
that course of action. 170 Ronald's father could make such a petition.
However, given the new guidelines, Ronald's situation, and Deanna's
knowledge of Ronald, it would be difficult to justify denying her
request.
Alternatively, Deanna could invoke the revised Guardian Statute
and make a decision regarding continuation of Ronald's treatment.
Because Deanna is Ronald's spouse, she would come under the
exception to court authorization in section 13-708(c)(2).171 Thus,
Deanna would be authorized in advance to make a decision regarding
medical procedures that could involve a substantial risk to Ronald's
life, without further court authorization.172 Unless Deanna's motives
for having Ronald's treatment terminated were questionable, there
would appear to be no reason why a court should find such prospective authorization inappropriate.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ostensibly to avoid "legislating" in a controversial area,173 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Mack v. Mack,174 adopted an
approach that deceptively allayed the court's fears of interfering with
the patient's rights by ignoring those rights if the patient never clearly
expressed the intent to choose a dignified end to his life. The court
did provide, however, needed impetus and illustration for the legis-·
lature in its fashioning of the HCDA. The legislature made it clear
that requiring courts to authorize every decision to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining procedures was unnecessarily disenfranchising to those who could best make such decisions. Thus, only when
there is a dispute, when the decision maker is not sufficiently close
to the patient, or when that decision maker's motives or reliability
are questionable, does the court intervene and impose its own judgment.

170. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-612(b) (1994).
171. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c)(2) (Supp. 1994).
172. [d.

173. The court seemed to indicate that it might have affected such a change had
there been a clear societal consensus: "[W]e are by no means confident that
there exists on this quality-of-Iife question the degree of societal consensus that
this Court ordinarily requires before announcing a change in the common
law." Mack, 329 Md. at 219-20, 618 A.2d at 760. But see Coyle, supra note
131.
174. 329 Md. 188, 217 A.2d 744 (1993).
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Moreover, the legislature found the requirement of clear and
convincing evidence of past intent of the patient to refuse treatments
to be unnecessarily restrictive. Under the new Advance Directive
Statute, no mention is made of clear and convincing evidence. Under
the revised Guardian Statute, when court authorization is necessary,
clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent is preferred but
not necessary, and the court may base its decision on the patient's
best interests.
The HCDA responded to the complex challenge and debate
underlying the laws that Mack interpreted. As a result, Maryland
has taken a position of leadership in a crucial area, providing
thorough, reasonable guidelines to focus on and protect its patients'
wishes and best interests in life and death matters .
. Thomas J. Brindisi

